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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Most critics of the death penalty claim that it is “cruel and unusual,” and thus 
unconstitutional, because of the pain caused in the process of executing someone, 
or because it is excessive and unnecessary to reduce crime.  Several recent botched 
executions lend support to the first claim, and statistical comparisons continue to 
show that the death penalty is not an effective deterrent.  Although recently the 
Supreme Court has in several rulings limited capital punishment—for example, 
making mentally impaired defendants and defendants under eighteen ineligible for 
execution, and limiting capital cases to crimes that cause a person’s death1—the 
Court has refused to rule it out entirely. 
A new argument against the death penalty’s constitutionality has recently 
emerged, however.  In July 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California, in a decision written by Judge Cormac J. Carney, ruled in Jones v. 
Chappell that the death penalty as it exists in California is cruel and unusual 
because of the length of time that inmates spend on death row, uncertain of when 
or whether they will be executed.2  Judge Carney’s order thus vacated Jones’s 
death sentence and invalidated California’s death penalty.  Subsequently, the state 
of California appealed Judge Carney’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment in Jones v. Davis, although it did so 
on technical or procedural grounds.3 
The principles underlying Jones’s appeal and the District Court’s ruling are 
not addressed in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, so the idea that systematic delays 
present a constitutional challenge continues to resonate with death penalty 
opponents.  In this paper, I argue against the substantive claims made by Judge 
Carney and conclude that the kind of arbitrariness surrounding the death penalty in 
California does not in fact violate the Eighth Amendment.  I explain why delays in 
administering the death penalty do not undermine the appeal to either deterrence or 
retribution, and I argue that the death penalty is not arbitrarily enforced in a 
morally or legally objectionable sense.  The death penalty in California is not cruel 
and unusual, at least not for the reasons that Judge Carney gives.  I suggest at the 
                                                                                                                            
 
*   Associate Professor of Philosophy, Central Washington University, Ellensburg, Washington. 
1   See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
2   See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
3   Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 539 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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end of the paper that other problems, including concerns about time on death row 
during the appeals process, provide better reasons for opposing the death penalty 
on both constitutional and moral grounds.  Thus, death penalty abolitionists would 
do better not to repeat the argument regarding delays in the post-conviction process 
that forms the basis of Jones v. Chappell. 
 
II. THE CASE OF JONES V. CHAPPELL (2014) 
 
The District Court’s ruling in Jones v. Chappell states that, in effect, the death 
penalty does not actually exist in California.4  In fact, since 1978, only 13 of more 
than 900 inmates on death row in California have been executed.5  Judge Carney 
explains why: with capital convictions, California, like most other states, requires a 
direct appeal to the state Supreme Court, in which the inmate challenges the claims 
made at trial.6   The inmate must wait years until a state-appointed lawyer is 
assigned to him or her—an average of three to five years in California—and then 
the appointed counsel must research the case, study case law, file an opening brief, 
wait for the state to file a responsive brief, and file a reply brief—a process that 
usually takes another few years.7  And if the state Supreme Court hears the case, it 
is usually two or three years before the case is scheduled and a judgment is made.  
The direct appeal is often followed by collateral review of habeas corpus issues by 
the state Supreme Court and federal appeals courts, possibly up to and including 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  At each step in the process, there are similar delays in 
appointing counsel, in researching the case and petitioning the court, and in the 
court’s review of the case.  The complete federal habeas review process takes 
about ten years.  Because of the numerous delays, those who are sentenced to death 
in California are effectively given a different punishment, according to Judge 
Carney: “For all practical purposes . . . a sentence of death in California is a 
sentence of life imprisonment with the remote possibility of death—a sentence no 
rational legislature or jury could ever impose.”8  Whether someone is actually 
executed depends not on whether someone committed a horrific crime, but whether 
appeals are made and reviewed in a timely manner.  Unfortunately, California has 
                                                                                                                            
 
4   See Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1062. 
5   CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., Inmates Executed, 1978 to Present, 
www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/Inmates_Executed.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2016); Chappell, 
31 F. Supp. 3d at 1053. 
6   Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1056. 
7   CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 122 (Gerald Uelman ed., 
2008), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=ncippubs; see 
also Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697 
(2007). 
8   Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1062. 
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been unable to implement an efficient review process because of an underfunded 
death penalty system, especially budget cuts to public defenders’ offices.9 
In his ruling in Jones v. Chappell, Judge Carney draws heavily on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, which created a de facto 
moratorium on the death penalty. 10   In Furman, the Court held 5-4 that the 
discretion afforded to the jury led to arbitrary sentences, often sentences that were 
too severe (because the same effect could be produced by lesser sentences) and 
that offended our common sense of justice.11  Thus, under the contemporary laws 
that allowed the jury wide latitude, the death penalty amounted to cruel and 
unusual punishment.  Justice Stewart put it this way: “These death sentences 
are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and 
unusual.”12  In other words, if a jury has broad discretion, people who deserve the 
death penalty could go free and people who do not deserve it could receive it.  This 
would not further the aims of either retribution or deterrence because there would 
be no correlation between guilt and punishment.  Some justices were particularly 
troubled by the presence of racial bias.13  If juries are basing their sentencing 
decisions on the race of the defendant rather than the relevant facts of the case, 
then the decision is being reached arbitrarily.  This amounts to cruel treatment of 
the accused because it is not giving the person what he or she deserves based on 
his or her actions, and thus “it does not comport with human dignity.”14 
According to Judge Carney, the death penalty in California has reached the 
same point.  Whether someone is executed depends on the speed with which 
counsel can be assigned and the courts can process an inmate’s appeals, not on his 
or her degree of guilt: “Inordinate and unpredictable delay has resulted in a death 
penalty system in which . . . arbitrary factors, rather than legitimate ones like the 
nature of the crime or the date of the death sentence, determine whether an 
individual will actually be executed.”15  This is unnecessary and cruel primarily 
                                                                                                                            
 
9   CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 7 at 132. 
10  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).  It was only a de facto moratorium because, 
although five justices agreed on a per curiam opinion that the death penalty violated the Constitution, 
they could not agree on the reasoning—each of the five majority justices produced his own opinion—
so there was no controlling opinion in the case.  In response to the ruling, the states with capital 
punishment revised their sentencing processes to ensure that the death penalty was not applied 
capriciously, and the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty shortly thereafter in 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).  
11  See Furman, 408 U.S. 238. 
12  Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
13   Id. at 249–51 (Douglas, J., concurring), 364–65 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
14  Id. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
15  Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 at 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
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because it does not give the defendant what he or she deserves (retribution) and it 
does not serve as an effective warning to other would-be murderers (deterrence).16 
The District Court’s ruling was overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in November 2015.17  The panel of judges ruled that Jones’s appeal to the 
District Court amounted to a novel constitutional rule and was therefore barred 
under Teague v. Lane.18  The Teague ruling seeks to ensure that state convictions 
are not always uncertain, which they would be if new constitutional theories could 
be advanced post-conviction; if new constitutional theories could be devised after 
any conviction, then no sentence would be final.19  Since “[t]he Supreme Court has 
never held that execution after a long tenure on death row is cruel and unusual 
punishment,” 20  finding in favor of Jones in this case would apply a new 
constitutional requirement that was not compelled by existing precedent at the time 
of his conviction.21 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Paul J. Watford claimed, contrary to the panel, 
that the rule announced by the District Court was substantive rather than 
procedural, and thus it was not precluded by Teague.22  However, Watford denied 
Jones’s claim because he had not exhausted the appeals process prior to the 
District Court’s review.23  Watford noted that Jones had raised a “so-called Lackey 
claim” to the California Supreme Court,24 contending that, in his own case, the 
                                                                                                                            
 
16  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the death penalty must further the penological 
goals of retribution and deterrence.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (citation 
omitted) (“The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence 
of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005); Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008) (“[C]apital punishment is excessive when it is grossly out of 
proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the two distinct social purposes served by the death 
penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.”). 
17  Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). 
18  Id.  See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
19  “The principle announced in Teague serves to ensure that gradual developments in the law 
over which reasonable jurists may disagree are not later used to upset the finality of state convictions 
valid when entered. This is but a recognition that the purpose of federal habeas corpus is to ensure 
that state convictions comply with the federal law in existence at the time the conviction became 
final, and not to provide a mechanism for the continuing reexamination of final judgments based 
upon later emerging legal doctrine.”  Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990). 
20  Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2006). 
21  It should be noted that both Jones’s attorneys and Carney claimed that they were not 
appealing to a new rule, but rather were drawing on the principles outlined in Furman.  For example, 
Jones’s attorneys wrote: “Mr. Jones’s claim is not barred by Teague . . . because the prohibition 
against arbitrariness in capital punishment is a well-established principle dictated by Furman and 
therefore not a new rule.”  Petitioner-Appellee’s Answering Brief at 12, Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 
(9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-56373).  
22  Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 at 553 (9th Cir. 2015) (Watford, J., concurring).  
23  Id.  
24  Id.  See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). 
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post-conviction delay rendered his death sentence cruel and unusual.25  However, 
the District Court granted relief based on a theory that California’s post-conviction 
review process rendered all capital convictions unconstitutional because of its 
arbitrariness.26  Thus, the District Court should not have granted him relief based 
on that claim, prior to filing a new habeas petition with the California Supreme 
Court. 
The Ninth Circuit in Jones v. Davis did not consider the merits of Jones’s 
claim that delays in the post-conviction review process render the death penalty 
unconstitutional.  Instead, it considered only whether Jones proposed a new 
constitutional rule: “Teague requires an analysis of the underlying legal theory of 
the claim—albeit to determine its novelty rather than its ultimate 
persuasiveness.”27  The court also noted that “judicial economy may outweigh 
constitutional-avoidance concerns,”28  meaning that the Teague issue was more 
easily resolvable and provided the basis for a less tenuous ruling than the deeper 
constitutional issues raised by the District Court.  Given the outpouring of support 
for Jones’s appeal—abolitionist groups submitted several amicus briefs and death 
penalty opponents throughout the country lauded the District Court’s ruling—we 
ought also to examine Judge Carney’s holding that the death penalty in California 
violates the principles set out in Furman.  
 
III. RETRIBUTION AND RESENTMENT 
 
I will begin with Judge Carney’s opinion that the death penalty in California 
does not serve a retributive purpose because it is arbitrarily enforced.  In Jones v. 
Chappell, Judge Carney stated that there is no common thread between those who 
are executed and those who are not.29  Prisoners who die of old age on death row 
do not commit less heinous offenses or undergo character conversions at a higher 
rate than those who are executed.  Rather, Judge Carney concluded, “[selection for 
execution] will depend upon a factor largely outside an inmate’s control, and 
wholly divorced from the penological purposes the State sought to achieve by 
sentencing him to death in the first instance: how quickly the inmate proceeds 
through the State’s dysfunctional post-conviction review process.” 30   Thus, he 
concluded that there is no correlation between guilt and execution—one’s 
execution does not depend on one’s crime—so retribution is not served by capital 
punishment. 
                                                                                                                            
 
25  Davis, 806 F.3d at 553 (Watford, J., concurring). 
26  Id. at 542 (majority opinion). 
27  Id. at 544. 
28  Id. at 545. 
29  Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
30  Id.  
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As mentioned earlier, Judge Carney’s opinion often draws on the Furman 
case for support.  However, the arbitrariness described in Furman is different from 
the kind of arbitrariness that is introduced when there is a delay in administering 
the death penalty.  The people who are on death row in these cases have been 
found by a jury, following the stricter guidelines that were judged to be 
constitutionally permissible in Gregg v. Georgia, to be guilty of a capital offense.  
Thus, both those who are executed and those who die on death row while waiting 
on the courts deserve to be executed.  Those who are executed consequently are 
not receiving harsher punishments than they deserve.  And, although those who are 
not executed may be getting lighter sentences than they deserve, this does not 
introduce any injustice, given that the delays are caused by an appeals process that 
is designed to protect their rights.31 
An appropriate analogy would be if you are speeding in your car and the cars 
around you are also speeding, but you are the one who is pulled over and given a 
ticket.  You may envy the others or be angry at the officer, but you cannot really 
resent the officer or the other drivers.  As Thomas Nagel defines it, resentment (as 
opposed to merely disliking something) involves a judgment that someone has 
wronged you, that he or she is being unreasonable in treating you that way.32  In 
this case, resentment toward the officer would be misplaced, because, all things 
being equal, you cannot claim that you do not deserve the ticket.  Of course, there 
are bad reasons to single you out that may warrant the feeling of resentment.  For 
example, if the officer stopped you because you are black and the other drivers are 
white, then that is not a good reason to treat you differently, and the decision to 
stop you instead of others is unjust.  But if he or she chose randomly among a 
group of speeding cars—one officer can only handle one driver at a time, after 
all—then the arbitrariness of your being stopped, although it may be bad luck for 
you, actually ensures that the law is being applied fairly.  Similarly, the mere fact 
that executions are not carried out with any discernible or rational pattern does not 
                                                                                                                            
 
31  See Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (“We 
believe that delay in capital cases is too long. But delay, in large part, is a function of the desire of 
our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore exhaustively, or at least sufficiently, any 
argument that might save someone’s life . . . .  [W]e do not see how the present situation even begins 
to approach a constitutional violation.”); People v. Seumanu, 355 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2015) (internal 
brackets omitted) (quoting People v. Anderson, 25 Cal. 4th 543, 606 (2001)) (“[S]uch delays are the 
product of ‘a constitutional safeguard, not a constitutional defect, because they assure careful review 
of the defendant’s conviction and sentence.’”).  The State of California made this point in its opening 
brief to the Ninth Circuit: “California provides capital defendants with substantial opportunities to 
challenge their convictions—and resources for doing so—for the precise purpose of ensuring that the 
death penalty will not be ‘arbitrarily’ imposed. Providing that sort of careful, individualized review 
through direct appeal and state habeas proceedings takes time.”  Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, 
Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 14-56373). 
32  THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 82–83 (1970); see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, 
Forgiveness and Resentment, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 
14–34 (1988). 
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matter as long as the selection process is not based on unjustifiable criteria, all of 
the people who are executed have been found guilty as a result of a justified legal 
process, and those people are only executed after the appeals process has been 
completed.  Under our legal system, we can say that the other people on death row 
should be executed, but we cannot say that the people who are executed should not 
be.  Yet Judge Carney’s ruling excludes everyone from being executed, rather than 
ensuring that everyone is executed who deserves to be. 
This is a different kind of arbitrariness than we have in Furman.  In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote, “of all the people convicted of rapes and 
murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are 
among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death 
has in fact been imposed.”33  Stewart’s concern was that juries had too much 
discretion and were determining punishment based on variable or irrelevant 
factors.34   Justices Douglas and Marshall worried specifically that juries were 
basing their sentencing decisions on racial prejudice, sentencing black defendants 
to death who did not deserve it and giving lighter sentences to white defendants 
who deserved the death penalty.35  This is a clear case of injustice.  If there is such 
bias in sentencing—and the evidence seems to indicate that there is, since the race 
of the victim and the race of the defendant are major factors in whether someone is 
sentenced to death36—then that would be a reason to challenge the death penalty’s 
constitutionality, as Justice Blackmun did in his dissenting opinion in Callins v. 
Collins.37  But, as the Ninth Circuit noted in its ruling,38 this has nothing to do with 
                                                                                                                            
 
33  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
34  Id. 
35  Id. at 249–51 (Douglas, J., concurring), 364–65 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
36  Non-white defendants are much more likely to receive the death penalty: 42% of the people 
on death row are black, even though they comprise only about 13% of the general population.  See 
AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DEATH BY DISCRIMINATION - THE CONTINUING ROLE OF 
RACE IN CAPITAL CASES 1 (2003), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR51/046/2003/en/ (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2016).  The strongest correlation between race and capital charges and convictions, 
however, is with regard to the race of the victim: 76% of the victims in death penalty cases are white, 
even though they account for only about 50% of murder victims.  See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
FACTS ABOUT DEATH PENALTY 1, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.  A black 
defendant who kills a white person is nine times more likely to be executed than a white defendant 
who kills a black person.  Id. at 2.  See also Race and the Death Penalty, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/race-and-death-penalty (last visited Sept. 27, 2016).  For racial 
disparities in California’s death sentencing in particular, see Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, 
The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-
1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2005). 
37  Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1151–55 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
38  Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 550–51 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[U]nlike the prisoners in Furman, 
Petitioner does not allege arbitrariness at sentencing. Instead, he alleges that the State ‘arbitrarily’ 
determines when to carry out a lawfully and constitutionally imposed capital sentence.”). 
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delays in the appeals process and the arbitrariness of whose appeals make their 
way through the courts, which is the issue in Jones v. Chappell, and it does not 
entail that those who are executed do not deserve the punishment.  Inmates who 
are executed are not getting more than they deserve, even though some inmates—
those who are not executed—are getting less than they deserve.  But again, this is 
not because of some morally unjustifiable reason that would elicit resentment 
rather than envy or anger. 
Judge Carney’s reasoning is not particularly clear here.  Drawing on the 
language of previous cases, he claims that, because of its arbitrary implementation, 
capital punishment in California does not adequately express society’s “moral 
outrage” 39  and does not provide victims’ families with “moral and emotional 
closure.”40  The first claim is debatable.  One could draw on Justice Brennan’s 
concurring opinion in Furman to rebut it.  He says that there is no evidence that 
death serves the purpose of reinforcing society’s moral values more than 
imprisonment does, and that “it is certainly doubtful that the infliction of death by 
the State does in fact strengthen the community’s moral code; if the deliberate 
extinguishment of human life has any effect at all, it more likely tends to lower our 
respect for life and brutalize our values.”41  Judge Carney’s assumption seems to 
be that the death penalty without significant delays would properly express our 
moral outrage, and that the death penalty in California does not accomplish this 
end because of the arbitrariness introduced by the delays.  Although Justice 
Brennan concedes that a community’s values cannot be reinforced if executions 
are rarely carried out, he also calls into question the assumption that it would be 
reinforced without the arbitrariness and delays.  That is, it is unlikely that spending 
much or all of the remainder of one’s life on death row, not knowing whether the 
execution will ever be carried out, expresses society’s moral outrage less forcefully 
than a speedy execution would.  It certainly is not so much less of a punishment as 
to render it ineffective as retribution. 
Judge Carney’s second claim, that the delay in carrying out a death sentence 
does not allow the victim’s family to achieve “closure,” rests on the faulty premise 
that a speedy execution would provide closure.42  There are several organizations 
of victims’ families that oppose the death penalty, such as Murder Victims’ 
Families for Human Rights, and studies indicate that families suffer during the 
extended appeals process and often experience a traumatic sense of loss after the 
execution. 43   Indeed, two such organizations, Murder Victims’ Families for 
                                                                                                                            
 
39  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). 
40  Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1998). 
41  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 303 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
42  Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
43  See, e.g., Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit, Assessing the Impact of the 
Ultimate Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: A Two State Comparison, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1 
(2012); Corey Burton & Richard Tewksbury, How Families of Murder Victims Feel Following the 
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Reconciliation and California Crime Victims for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, 
submitted an amicus brief to the Ninth Circuit in support of Jones’s case, claiming 
that, instead of bringing “some form of psychological relief to the families of the 
victims . . . the imposition of the death penalty has the opposite effect of 
prolonging and exacerbating the terrible pain and grief experienced by co-
victims.”44  The idea that executing the murderer provides closure to the victim’s 
loved ones is a politically useful myth, but it typically does not hold true in reality.  
Judge Carney’s opinion also does nothing to further the Eighth Amendment 
argument.  Whether a family feels satisfied with a punishment does not determine 
whether it is cruel, or else gruesome torture would be constitutionally permissible 
if the victim’s family were particularly bloodthirsty. 
 
IV. EXPECTATIONS AND DETERRENCE 
 
Judge Carney also claims that delays and uncertainty make the death penalty 
ineffective and unnecessary as a deterrent.45  Although it is true in general that a 
certain punishment is a more effective deterrent than an uncertain punishment—the 
courts have long recognized this46—the argument that a delay in administering the 
death penalty undermines its deterrent effect depends on several faulty 
assumptions.  First, there is no convincing evidence that the death penalty without 
a delay deters, and no convincing evidence that the delay and uncertainty are 
crucial in removing that as a justification.  Although a few studies seem to show 
that the death penalty has some effect on rates of violent crime47—more on that 
later—numerous statistical analyses indicate that the death penalty does not deter 
more than life in prison.  Comparisons of violent crime rates in states with and 
without the death penalty,48 comparisons of countries with and without the death 
penalty,49 and surveys of experts from the American Society of Criminology, the 
                                                                                                                            
Execution of Their Loved One’s Murderer: A Content Analysis of Newspaper Reports of Executions 
from 2006-2011, 1 J. QUAL. CRIM. JUST. & CRIMINOLOGY 53 (2013).  See also The Closure Myth, 
EQUAL JUSTICE USA, http://ejusa.org/learn/victims-families/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2016). 
44  Brief of Amici Curiae Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation and California Crime 
Victims for Alternatives to the Death Penalty in Support of Appellee at 1, Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 
538 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-56373). 
45  Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1063–64. 
46  See, e.g., United States v. Panico, 308 F.2d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 1962); Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991). 
47  See infra note 56. 
48  See Deterrence: States Without the Death Penalty Have Had Consistently Lower Murder 
Rates, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/deterrence-states-without-death-
penalty-have-had-consistently-lower-murder-rates (last visited Sept. 27, 2016); Raymond Bonner & 
Ford Fessenden, Absence of Executions: A Special Report; States with No Death Penalty Share 
Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2000), www.nytimes.com/2000/09/22/us/absence-
executions-special-report-states-with-no-death-penalty-share-lower.html?pagewanted=all. 
49  See AMNESTY INT’L, NOT MAKING US SAFER: CRIME, PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY (Oct. 10, 2013), www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ACT51/002/2013/en/. 
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Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, and the Law and Society Association 
indicate that increasing the number of executions, or decreasing the time spent on 
death row before execution, does not produce a general deterrent effect.50  There is 
no discernable deterrent effect when comparing the same state before and after 
prohibition (e.g., before and after the Furman decision)51 or before and after highly 
publicized death sentences and executions; 52  and when comparing 
socioeconomically and geographically similar states or bordering counties in 
neighboring states with and without the death penalty.53  With regard to the more 
specific question, a study and review of the literature by William Bailey has found 
that the speed and certainty of execution has no impact on its deterrent effects.54  
Given all of this data, one cannot claim that the death penalty fails to deter (and is 
therefore excessive) because of the delay; it likely fails to deter regardless of how 
quickly it is carried out. 
Second, even without the delay, the death penalty—and indeed other 
punishments—is always uncertain, so it is unlikely that having this delay makes 
capital punishment markedly more uncertain in the mind of the criminal.  Hugo 
Adam Bedau explains the problem: 
 
Most capital crimes are committed in the heat of the moment. Most 
capital crimes are committed during moments of great emotional stress 
or under the influence of drugs or alcohol, when logical thinking has 
been suspended. Many capital crimes are committed by the badly 
emotionally-damaged or mentally ill. In such cases, violence is inflicted 
by persons unable to appreciate the consequences to themselves as well 
as to others. 
Even when crime is planned, the criminal ordinarily concentrates on 
escaping detection, arrest, and conviction. The threat of even the severest 
punishment will not discourage those who expect to escape detection and 
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arrest. It is impossible to imagine how the threat of any punishment 
could prevent a crime that is not premeditated.55 
 
Few criminals believe that they will be caught, so from the point that a crime is 
planned, there is at least a lack of certainty regarding the punishment (and at most 
a belief that one will not be punished).  And murders committed in the heat of the 
moment or by people who are mentally unbalanced are done without a serious 
consideration of the possible consequences.  Even if a criminal is caught, what 
follows is a plea agreement or a trial, which results in uncertainty about whether he 
or she will be found guilty, how much he or she will be punished (if at all), and 
whether any possible appeal will be successful.  If mere uncertainty rendered a 
punishment cruel, then that would undermine the justification of all punishments, 
not only the death penalty.  It is likely that a delay in administering the death 
penalty caused by further appeals makes the punishment even more uncertain, but 
it is unlikely that this delay crucially impacts the deterrent effect of the death 
penalty.  In short, if a potential murderer is not deterred by the prospects of life on 
death row, he or she is not likely to be deterred by the threat of execution. 
Of course, none of this proves that the death penalty fails to deter violent 
criminals.  Supporters of the death penalty could claim, for example, that states 
with the death penalty would have even higher crime rates without the death 
penalty: the people there are more violent, so they need harsher punishments just to 
make the crime rates comparable with other states.  In addition, they may cite 
studies that seem to indicate that the death penalty does deter.56  If we take these 
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studies seriously, we are left to conclude, in light of the other studies mentioned 
above, that the evidence is inconclusive regarding the deterrent effects of the death 
penalty. 
Even if we only acknowledge that the deterrence issue has not been settled, 
however, that is enough to upset Judge Carney’s ruling in Jones v. Chappell.  For 
Jones, the question is not whether the death penalty deters, or even whether it is 
reasonable to believe that the death penalty does not deter.  The question is 
whether the evidence presented to Judge Carney was sufficient to prove that the 
death penalty does not deter because of the delay.  Judge Carney struck down an 
existing law in California based on this proposition, but the evidence in support of 
the proposition is entirely lacking. 
 
V. THE CRUELTY OF AWAITING EXECUTION ON DEATH ROW 
 
A stronger reason for the unconstitutionality of the death penalty that Judge 
Carney did not address in Jones v. Chappell, but that is also based on the delays, 
has to do with the living conditions on death row.  Death row was not originally 
designed for long-term incarceration, so, arguably, languishing on death row is 
itself cruel, rather than (or in addition to) the act of execution itself.  Cells in 
California’s death row are about four feet across, nine feet long, and seven feet 
from floor to ceiling.  Most death row inmates must remain in their cells for 
twenty-three hours a day or more, and recreational activities for death row inmates 
have decreased recently, as they have been denied materials for pursuing hobbies.  
This is both physically and mentally debilitating, as one former death row inmate 
attests: “There was room enough only for push-ups, sit-ups, and squats, 
insufficient to exercise all the body’s muscles. We were allowed out of our cells 
and into the hallway—one at a time—for only fifteen minutes twice a week for a 
shower.”57  In addition, although some death row prisoners are allowed visitors, 
most do not receive any, and there are tight restrictions on who can come and 
when.  Journalist Nancy Mullane claims that the prisoners she interviewed in 
California “hadn’t seen a ‘free’ person who wasn’t an officer or an administrator 
with the prison in more than a decade.” 58   Physical confinement and social 
isolation for years at a time are not done as a temporary measure (for example, to 
protect other prisoners from an out-of-control inmate), but are experienced by 
some of these prisoners for years, until they die of natural causes.  This produces 
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great emotional stress and anxiety, called the “death row phenomenon,” and these 
reactions often give rise to a mental illness known as “death row syndrome.”59  
Psychological suffering becomes part of the punishment. 
Although most death row inmates continue their appeals for as long as they 
can—to forestall death, because they are innocent, or for other reasons—a 
statistically significant number of inmates forego ordinary appeals and willingly 
take their punishment, allowing them some measure of control over their fate and 
an escape from years alone in a small cell.  Some people have claimed that this 
amounts to state-assisted suicide, which allows prisoners, many of whom are 
clinically depressed or mentally ill, to avoid acknowledging what they have done.60  
Since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, there have been 141 such 
“execution volunteers.”61  In addition, the suicide rate of death row inmates is 
about ten times the rate of suicide in the United States as a whole and about six 
times the rate of suicide in the U.S. general prison population.62  For all of these 
inmates, death—sometimes a very painful death—is preferable to life on death 
row.63 
The physically and psychologically injurious conditions on death row are, of 
course, compounded by the uncertainty of not knowing when, or whether, one is 
actually going to be executed.  Thus, the arbitrariness of who is executed and the 
delays caused by the dysfunctional justice system create conditions under which 
inmates are subjected to something like torture; death row inmates are physically 
confined and socially isolated for years, in ways that the general prison population 
is not, and they are constantly subjected to the threat of execution, which may 
never be carried out.  This is a much more traditional argument against the death 
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penalty than the one Judge Carney gives: The punishment is cruel because of the 
physical and mental suffering involved; it is unusual because inmates are treated in 
ways that are not acceptable to much of American society, and certainly to much 
of the world; and overall, it is, as Justice Brennan says in Furman, “degrading to 
human dignity.”64 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: BETTER REASONS TO OPPOSE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
 
The irony of my approach in this paper is that traditional arguments against 
the death penalty are actually being used to criticize Judge Carney’s ruling that the 
death penalty is cruel and unusual.  For example, I have claimed that the delay 
does not undermine the death penalty’s deterrent effect because there is no 
deterrent effect without the delay, that life in prison expresses society’s moral 
outrage as well as execution does, that arbitrariness is wrong when it is racially 
motivated but not when it is due to delays in the appeals process, and so on.  If my 
arguments are accepted, then the Ninth Circuit could have struck down the District 
Court’s ruling on more than procedural grounds.  The court could have rejected the 
substance of the challenge, which would have upset abolitionist groups who see 
post-conviction delays as their new, best hope for challenging the constitutionality 
of the death penalty. 
I have shown that such an abolitionist strategy is misguided.  One can, and 
indeed should, oppose the death penalty for other, more compelling reasons, 
reasons that do not depend on a comparison between the death penalty as it is 
applied in California and the death penalty as it would ideally be applied.  Instead, 
one can claim that the death penalty, with or without California’s delays, does not 
serve the aims of either retribution or deterrence more than life in prison does, that 
executions are excessively painful, that capital cases are corrupted by racial bias, 
and that a modern, liberal democracy should not be executing its own citizens—all 
of which support the claim that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment.  
To achieve their long-term goals, opponents of capital punishment should hold fast 
to these arguments.  They should not embrace the ruling in Jones v. Chappell. 
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